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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ARMAND KWANZA BROWN, : Case No. 2008043 5-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (Supp. 2008). The trial court entered judgment against Appellant Armand 
Brown (in error) for aggravated burglary, a second degree felony offense (Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003)), and judgment for aggravated assault, a third degree felony 
offense (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2003)). The judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Whether the judgment and sentence for aggravated burglary is in error since 
Brown entered a guilty plea for simple burglary. 
Standard of Review: Brown has raised the first issue on appeal under the plain-
error doctrine. This Court will consider whether an error exists and whether the error is 
obvious and prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ff 30, 57, 992 P.2d 
951 (court will consider plain error on appeal). Also, this Court may consider clerical 
error for the first time on appeal. See State v. Lorrak 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988). 
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B. Whether the trial court's restitution order for Cheree Weatherspoon's 
relocation costs is in error. 
Standard of Review: "We 'will not disturb a trial court's restitution order "unless 
it exceeds that prescribed by law or [unless the court] otherwise abused its discretion.'" 
However, we review a trial court's interpretation of restitution statutes for correctness." 
State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, f 5, 60 P.3d 582 (internal citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Since the first issue was not preserved in the record, Brown has raised it under the 
plain-error doctrine. See Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 30 (recognizing that appellate court 
will consider plain error); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e), 30(b) (2008) (allowing 
sentencing and clerical errors to be corrected at any time). The second issue was 
preserved at R. 70-72; 107. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Brown has attached as Addendum B the following statutes, which contain the 
language in effect in 2007 relating to sentencing and restitution: Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-
25a-403 (2004); 63-25a-419 (2004); 76-3-201 (Supp. 2007); 77-38a-101 (2003); 77-38a-
102 (Supp. 2008); 77-38a-201 (2003); 77-38a-202 (2003); 77-38a-203 (Supp. 2008); 77-
38a-301 (2003); and 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On January 30, 2007, the State filed an information against Brown for aggravated 
burglary, aggravated assault, violation of a no-contact order, assault, and damage to a 
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communication device. (R. 1-4). On March 12, 2007, Brown entered a guilty plea for 
burglary and aggravated assault. (R. 26; 126). The State dismissed the remaining 
charges. (R. 26). 
On August 24, 2007, the trial court sentenced Brown to suspended prison terms 
and placed him on probation for 36 months. (R. 57-59). In addition, the court ordered 
that defendant "pay full restitution and the State has 180 days to submit an Order." (R. 
58). On February 29, 2008, the State filed a Motion for Restitution. (R. 61-69). On 
March 8, 2008, Brown objected. (R. 70-72). On April 18, 2008, the trial court held a 
hearing on the matter and ordered restitution as requested by the State. (R. 88-90). 
Brown filed a notice of appeal. (R. 91). 
The appeal is timely. Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4 (2008). Brown is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January 2007, the State filed an information against Brown for aggravated 
burglary, aggravated assault, violation of a no-contact order, assault, and damage to a 
communication device. (R. 1-4). In March, Brown entered a plea of guilty to charges for 
burglary and aggravated assault, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. (R. 26-
33; 126). The plea affidavit described the factual grounds for the offenses as follows: "At 
2803 South Adams Street, in [Salt Lake County], Utah, on or about January 23, 2007, 
Armand Kwanza Brown entered the home of his girlfriend [Cheree Weatherspoon] 
without permission and got in a fight with her mother Spring Weatherspoon who received 
a cut to her hand." (R. 27; see also R. 126:4). The affidavit also identified the elements 
for the offenses as follows: "(A) The defendant entered or remained unlawfully in the 
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dwelling of another with intent to commit assault. (B) The defendant threatened with use 
of unlawful force causing bodily injury to another." (R. 27; 126). 
After entry of the plea, the trial court ordered a presentence investigation report 
(see R. 24; 35, Presentence Report), which included Brown's "statement regarding this 
offense." (R. 35, Presentence Report: 3). It stated, 
I was coming home to my house to get my things far as clothes and I had got into 
an argument with Cheree and her mother was drunk and she had attack me from 
behind. She had threw water in my face and she had threw a glass jar at me and 
she had missed me and it fell on the kitchen floor and it had bust everywhere. So I 
had pushed her off me and she had ran towards the kitchen. She had slipped and 
fell and had cut her hand on the floor and she had started to bleed. So me and 
Cheree was still arguing she had hit me and we started to fight so I had left outside 
the house and I had told her to give me my clothes and she said know so I had 
push the door in kinda hard and the door broke. I feel like I should have got the 
police and told them to assist me in getting my clothes stead arguing and fighting 
and taken it to a whole nother level. I feel bad because deep down I still love them 
and we could solve are own problems but I will learn from my mistakes. The rea-
son all this happened was because I was coming to her house off of work and I had 
seen a black guy parking outside of the house and I thought that she was seing him 
steady me trying to talk to her I just started yelling and one thing led to another 
and her mom was drunk and she just started to attack me so I had defend myself. 
(R. 35, Presentence Report: 3; see also R. 49, Psychological Evaluation: 4-5 (reflecting 
defendant's statement about the offenses)). The presentence report contained no 
infomiation about Spring or Cheree Weatherspoon or restitution. (R. 35, Presentence 
Report: 5 (stating "This agent received no victim impact statement's [sic], medical 
information or restitution information. This agent attempted to telephone the victims at 
the number provided however a recording stated they were unavailable because the phone 
was off or they were outside of the service area.")). Adult Probation and Parole 
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recommended a "restitution hearing be scheduled within 60 days of sentencing." (Id.) 
On August 24, 2007, the trial court entered judgment against Brown. It sentenced 
him to suspended prison terms and probation for aggravated burglary and aggravated 
assault, and it ordered him to pay "full restitution." (R. 57-59). Also, the court ordered 
the State to submit a restitution amount within "180 days." (R. 57-59; 107:9). On 
February 29, 2008, the State filed a request for $2,970.72 in restitution. (R. 61). It filed 
the request 189 days after the entry of judgment. The State included documents from the 
Office of Crime Victims' Reparations, which showed reparations paid to Cheree 
Weatherspoon for ambulance expenses ($989.74), two months' rent ($1,300.00), and rent 
deposit ($500), and reparations paid to Spring Weatherspoon for medical expenses 
($180.98). (R. 65-69). 
Brown objected to the State's request for restitution as untimely, and he objected 
to restitution for rent deposit and two months' rent ($1,800) since defendant "was not 
charged with any financial or rental scheme nor was he charged with any damage to any 
real property. The defendant did not admit responsibility for any conduct consisting of 
any rental restitution at the time of sentencing." (R. 70-72). The trial court rejected 
Brown's arguments and ordered restitution in the full amount. (R. 89-90; 107:16). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in entering a judgment and sentence against Brown for count 
1, aggravated burglary, a second degree felony offense. According to the record, the 
State amended count 1 against Brown, and he entered a guilty plea for simple burglary. 
Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment for aggravated burglary. The trial court 
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committed plain or clerical error. Brown requests that this Court vacate the judgment for 
aggravated burglary and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment and sentence. 
Next, the trial court ordered Brown to reimburse Crime Victims' Reparations for 
relocation costs paid to Cheree Weatherspoon. The trial court's order for restitution is 
improper since Brown did not agree to pay restitution for relocation costs, and he did not 
admit responsibility for and was not convicted of criminal activities relating to relocation 
expenses. In addition, the restitution order for relocation costs is speculative, 
insupportable and arbitrary. Finally, the prosecutor requested relocation costs to 
compensate Cheree Weatherspoon for "fear" and loss of "safety." Compensation for 
those purposes is more properly characterized as damages for pain and suffering. Such 
damages are not recoverable as restitution under Utah law. Brown respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate the trial court's restitution order as it relates to relocation costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDGMENT FOR AGGRAVATED BURGLARY IS IN ERROR. 
Rule 22(e) states that a court "may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence im-
posed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2008). Rule 30 allows 
a court to correct a clerical mistake in the judgment at any time. IcL at 30(b) (2008). The 
Utah Supreme Court has relied on those provisions to ensure that a written judgment is in 
harmony with the trial court's oral pronouncements in the proceedings. 
In State v. LorraK 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988), the defendant entered a guilty plea 
for rape of a child, which carried a minimum-mandatory prison term, and the trial court 
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ordered the defendant to serve a prison sentence of at least ten years. IcL at 1389. 
Thereafter, a substitute clerk completed a preprinted judgment form providing for a 
sentence "not to exceed" ten years. IcL The trial court amended the judgment (twice) so 
that it would be in harmony with the originally pronounced minimum-mandatory 
sentence, and the defendant appealed. IcL On review, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the amended judgment as proper. It cited to Rules 22(e) and 30(b), and stated that "both 
clerical errors and illegal sentences may be corrected at any time." IcL at 1389-90. 
In this case, Brown entered a guilty plea in open court to a charge for count 1, 
simple burglary, a second degree felony offense; and count 2, aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony offense. (R. 26; 126); see Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (2008) (allowing for the 
entry of a guilty plea); see also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372-73 (Utah 1996) 
(stating a trial court must ensure that the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary and that the 
defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense). The trial court accepted 
the guilty pleas. (See R. 33). 
However, during sentencing, the court entered judgment for count 1, "aggravated" 
burglary, a second degree felony offense. (R. 57). That was error. This Court may 
vacate the judgment, and order correction of the error under Rules 22(e) and 30(b) and 
under the plain-error doctrine. The written judgment reflects clerical error in sentencing 
that may be corrected at any time. LorraK 761 P.2d at 1389-90; Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e), 
30(b). In addition, under the plain-error doctrine, the record supports that (i) an error 
exists, (ii) the error is obvious, and (iii) the error is prejudicial. See State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 1993) (identifying plain-error standard). 
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Under the first and second prongs of the plain-error doctrine, an obvious error 
exists where the parties and court intended Brown to plead guilty to an amended count 1 
for simple burglary, a second degree felony offense. (See R. 26; 126); see also Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202(2) (stating burglary is a second degree felony); 76-6-203(2) 
(2003) (stating aggravated burglary is a first degree felony). (But see R. 57-59; 89-90 
(entering judgment for aggravated burglary, amended to a second degree felony)). 
Also, based on this record, it is obvious that Brown did not knowingly or 
voluntarily enter a guilty plea to a charge for aggravated burglary: he was not advised at 
the time of the plea of the elements for aggravated burglary, and he did not admit to facts 
or elements constituting aggravated burglary (Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203(1) (defining 
aggravated burglary)), among other things. (See R. 26; 126); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e) (setting forth the requirements of the trial court in taking a plea); Thurman, 911 
P.2d at 372 (stating trial court must establish that the plea is knowing and voluntary and 
that defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense); State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) (stating Rule 11(e) places on trial courts "the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional" requirements are met for guilty pleas). 
Nevertheless, the trial court entered judgment and sentence on count 1, "aggra-
vated" burglary, a second degree felony offense. (R. 57-59; 89-90). Brown does not 
contend that the entry was "'the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning and 
determination.'" Lor rah, 761 P.2d at 1389 (citation omitted). Rather, it was clerical 
error. Id/, Utah E.. Crim. P. 30(b). Also, it was plain and obvious error under the first 
and second prongs of the plain-error analysis. See Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998, 999 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that aggravated burglary is a first degree felony; also 
"aggravated burglary" for a lesser degree "is a legal impossibiiii;. unues ' M), ;^  -
Specifically, prejudice exists due to the ambiguity caused by the written judgment. See 
Parry, 837 P.2d at 999 (recognizing the ambiguity when aggravated burglary is lacniiha; 
as a lesser ofiensc . . -J - .L. ' , , . v " i r : ' . v i > fc":i::.'*T\ • i , r i v ' - j ^ \ ..-• - I,M5»--:-
I 'i^r-\ *VR. 57-59; 89-90). Yet simple burglary of a dwelling is a second degree felony. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(2); see also Utah Code Ann, § ^6-6-203(2) (stating 
aggravated burgki"> :._,: ;i:-L :, uiv-..-,-!••. . •-'flense ' • - ••• •* . ^ < • 
i f flic 11 ii lament i.(- not coiTected to reflect a conviction for burglary, the ambiguity may be 
used against Brown to his detriment in future filings. That is, if Brown is convicted of a 
criminal offense u. H\L iL.iuiv, .^ii.ii IYLL-^LIO;: J..,.: r.:-u.* i J\ h s . v iiic " igguA^m.. ' 
aspect o f 1 lie h> • • :" ^ f'V^N : v;v to recommend a harsher term in sentencing against 
Brown in that future case. See, e.g., Utah Court Rules Ann., App. D at 1640 (2008) 
(setting forth sentencing guidelines based on violent msioiy una oncn^cs). 
Since Brown did not plrnd hen: io a^gr.ivnfcd burglary or to an aggravated second 
degree felony offense (R. 26), it would be unfair and improper to reflect such a 
conviction, on his record or to use it againsi rnrri m ; jture proceedings. . • -
(soe> ic
 r ; c i - :"'?sp •:• *Vil\ u -n;.^.ts (hit rl*;" ;' nut vacate the -udmnent and 
sentence for count 1, aggravated burglary, a second degree felony offense {see R. 57-59; 
89-90), and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment and 
sentence in the matter. See Lorran. .: "^  - -0. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION ORDER FOR RELOCATION 
COSTS IS IMPROPER. 
A trial court may order restitution if the defendant (i) has agreed to pay restitution 
as part of a plea disposition, (ii) has admitted responsibility for criminal conduct resulting 
in pecuniary damages, or (iii) has been convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary 
damages. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-301 (2003); 77-38a-302(l), (5)(a) (Supp. 
2008); Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, \ 9 (stating defendant may be ordered to pay 
restitution "for crimes not listed in the information so long as a defendant admits 
responsibility or agrees to pay restitution", and recognizing defendant may be ordered to 
pay restitution in connection with a conviction) (citation omitted); State v. Watson, 1999 
UT App 273, \ 3, 987 P.2d 1289 (same); State v. Simonette, 881 P.2d 963, 964-65 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (stating defendant could be ordered to pay for treatment costs relating to 
the victim's brother where he admitted in a diagnostic report to abusing the brother); see_ 
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2) (Supp. 2008) (defining "[criminal activities" to 
mean "any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for 
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an 
admission of committing the criminal conduct"). 
Under the first alternative, the law requires a prosecutor to disclose restitution 
amounts at the time of the plea disposition, as follows: 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony 
or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, 
or district attorney shall provide to the district court: 
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution; 
10 
('* : t-v nrv, i or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and 
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part 
of the plea disposition. 
(3) li charges arc not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution 
claims from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2003); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-201 (2003) 
(requiring law enforcement to a ^ e ^ j ta;: ^».^ u - ., 
•- " ^ i ; , : ! ^ * -}- - • • :nv;i;il conduct). Thereafter, if the defendant agrees to pay, the trial 
court may order restitution in a particular amount. See^ Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l). 
Ifthe defendant "'..j-yects to mc ;:nj)osiLk)n, amoi:1: . : • - .-*-JU,'. • ' 
]
 -
i ; < •• • - <ir\\>iul- • ] hc;:rin- PH the issue." ft!, iv. «J 77-38a-302(4); see 
also Bickley, 2002 UT App 342. *H: 3. KM 2 (recognizing that defendant "agree[d] that 
total victim restitution be enieieJ in the amount of my obligation for child support 
.••; \u- .:.. deiem:- v ,: ; ": <'-*' '.-t *nd;m: .•'•*:<-•» * 1 - ^  ^ he trial court's order). 
Under the second alternative, the defendant may be ordered to pay restitution "for 
crimes not listed in the information so long as [heJ admits responsibility5' for the conduct. 
Bicklew 2\>' -2 . -.. \ ^- >• f *-"** - -^ - .•»- 'K :M-\ <I*• the criminal 
conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty pica, be Sore the court can order restitu-
tion." State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, m I S . 4 u i \ . - t ; t , - o V CILUJOU ^ m n i e c ) ir m n g 
(.iL-icuc.an. .^. '^ •i . . . . - .^-i . .-. i . .:..-. : v »: *•- -.h :-i'? * !-r,r •• .p.-;-.. • :y or 
agree to pay amounts). Indeed, a trial court may not infer a defendant's participation i;; 
conduct (see Mast, 2001 UT App 402, If 18 (citing State v. GallU 967 P.2d ^30, )S • -:o 
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(Utah 1998))), an admission of responsibility from the defendant (Bickley, 2002 UT App 
342,1f 12 (citing Watson, 1999 UT App 273, | 5)), or a defendant's state of mind 
(Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ]f 5) to justify restitution under the second alternative. 
Under the third alternative, once a defendant pleads guilty to an offense, the trial 
court has broad discretion to order restitution supported by the evidence "for any 
pecuniary damages clearly resulting from" that offense. State v. Eight, 2008 UT App 
118, t 5, 182 P.3d 922 (citing State v. CorbitU 2003 UT App 417, \ 16, 82 P.3d 211). In 
HighU the defendant pled guilty to burglary, among other things, and the trial court 
ordered him to compensate the victim for "items missing from the premises he admitted 
to burglarizing." M, at f^ } 1-3. This Court upheld the restitution order since the missing 
items related to the burglary conviction. See idL at fflf 5-6 (citation omitted). 
In addition to specifying when a defendant may be ordered to pay restitution for 
his conduct, Utah law specifies what damages may be recoverable in restitution. 
According to the law, a trial court may order restitution for pecuniary damages. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a) (Supp. 2007) (stating a court may order restitution for 
pecuniary damages); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-301; 77-38a-302(l). The 
phrase "[pjecuniary damages" is defined to mean demonstrable damages for "economic 
injury, whether or not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising 
out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities" and it includes 
"the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary 
damages and pain and suffering." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (Supp. 2008); see. 
1? 
also State v. Gibson, 2006 UT App 49o. \ fc. 1 53 I\3d "7 i < v'\\ h^n considering what the 
victim tacould recover against the defendam ' n a ^ h , ^ ; . •>.. .HL ^ l ion must ari.v* on =,»f 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, the restitution provisions limit recovery to 
those amounts which are "necessary to compensate a victim u>r losses caused by the 
ujicnciiiM '' Monson \-. Lu/ >^. ''J.4- i' «. -ec ,.«/>t/ I ' M 
Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(a) (stating restitution compensates for "all losses caused by the 
defendant"); Hight, 2008 UT App 118, ^ 5 (stating restitution may be onie;\.e * here 
evidence .-up .^M ,::•..',:•> • . - . . ; . M ••'.! • "ensc . C urba:* 2,»,t ' '•!-• 
41 - «• u_2g (Qnnc. J.n concurring) (explaining that Utah courts have prohibited 
restitution awards for "dignitary invasions/' or damages for an affront to a person's 
dignity or emotional harm) (eilahufi otrtttt • .. Mate -. Romii>.},L, v-.' r f>!"^  5 v - ( I I I I i 
( \ • • •' •"i {statinc restitution should be ordered "where liability is clear as u matter 
of law and where commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or 
damages"), cert, deniecu h; b :• ,: . . \ ,.m rr-\ 
\ lso, if a victim accepts an award of reparations from Crime Victims' 
Reparations, she must assign all claims for restitution to that entity. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ (>3-Jea-4".
 t . • ^ - « : „ ; - r-i . • i _. ;";•-*;. : : ! i a : e u i \ 
n - j : . >; ;< ^.l---irr;v.M!i'ir the order of restitution" imposed against a defendant; 
indeed, a court "shall not consider a reparations award when determining the order of 
restitution nor when enforcing restitution." See_ LULI I o^ ^le, . ; ^e _:a *• *e*. -. ^ 
i//.N(y , -ae .K".^  ""."^ »-^iC(5»l h» • • i-^MlVI;^ -: M':'> •>•• ''ostituuon where the 
13 
court shall consider the cost of damage or loss for destruction of property, the cost of 
medical and professional services and devices for care and treatment rendered, the cost of 
physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation, lost income to the victim, lost 
wages due to theft of or damage to items necessary to the victim's employment or trade, 
and the cost of funeral and related services as a result of the victim's death). 
In this case, Brown pled guilty to two offenses: burglary of Cheree 
Weatherspoon's residence with intent to commit assault, and aggravated assault against 
Spring Weatherspoon. (R. 26-33 (stating the offenses occurred in January 2007)). 
Several months after sentencing, the State submitted paperwork for restitution. (R. 61-
69). The paperwork showed reparations to Cheree and Spring Weatherspoon for 
ambulance and medical expenses ($989.74 and $180.98 respectively), rent deposit for 
August 2007 ($500), and rent for August and September 2007 ($1300). (R. 65-69). The 
State requested restitution in the full amount of reparations. (R. 61). According to the 
prosecutor, Brown should be ordered to pay restitution for relocation costs, Le^ rent 
deposit and two months' rent, because the offenses caused Cheree to fear and "to lose" 
her safety, "her feeling of safety anyway." (R. 107:12-13). Also, Cheree made the 
"choice" to relocate. (R. 107:13). 
Brown objected to such restitution as inappropriate. (R. 70-72); Utah Code Ann. § 
77-38a-302(4) (stating if defendant objects, he is entitled to a full hearing). He 
maintained he was not liable for costs incurred by Cheree for rent deposit and two 
months' rent several months after the offenses. (See R. 107:13-14). 
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Thereafter, the trial judge allowed restitution in the entire amount. (R. 107:16). 
The judge stated, "You know, she probably lost the deposit [on her former residence] 
I in iioine to order the full amount of restitution." (Id.) 
The trial court's order was improper since Brown did not agree to pay, he did not 
admit respons iD]-.. u->. .uiw :.. ^ *.*- ; ••• i ... • ** -„.>..•; u - ji,;^. i, .ji. _a; -. 
i -\pensc-. (.See /////Y/, Argument II.A.) In addition, the record fails to support restitution 
for such expenses. (See infra, Argument II.B.) Finally, under TTtah law. a trial court ivy 
not order restitution to compensate u-' i.a1 .L:U , ^s * . sulci). ». x v ///?y.<. .-\:uu. ^ -
• •. i ..x • vtfulh ••tvvK-^ N thai ihib Court vacate the trial court's restitution order 
as it relates to rent deposit and two months' rent. 
A. BROWN DID NOT AGREE TO PA* , D I L H N U i
 L 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR, AND WAS NOT CONVR i ^ Oi I ( J N D L A T 
RELATING TO RELOCATION EXPENSES. 
Under the law, Brown "cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities 
f<->r which [he] did not admit responsibility, was not convicuvu i -i JJO not agree to pay 
\:-i.ii '. : ,>;. / m A ^ i , ~ j ' -. . t " *~ir>.i ! *- ' t ^ i - : ' i - . , >. • I - . c a t i o n 
costs as part of the plea agreement. (See R. 26-33 (stating that "[a]ll the promises, duties, 
and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, 
one to plead guilty to burger*' ind aggravated assault); see also R. 126). The State's 
filings acknowledged as much. [See R. 61 (recognizing that defendant may "submit[] an 
objection''to restitution /.; .vr.img • .v -..IU !:.;^!:.-- ;; ,"*' t\ airy 
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amounts in restitution at the time of the plea disposition. (See R. 26-33; 126); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-202(l); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-201 (requiring law 
enforcement to include report for restitution when conducting an investigation for 
criminal conduct); Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ffl[ 3, 10 (recognizing that as part of the 
plea agreement, defendant specifically agreed that "total victim restitution be entered in 
the amount of my obligation for child support arrears . . . with the understanding that the 
amount of court[-]ordered restitution and monthly [payments] remain to be determined 
by the court"). Thus, Brown cannot be required to pay restitution on that basis. 
Second, Brown did not admit responsibility for conduct resulting in relocation 
costs. According to this Court, if the defendant admits responsibility for conduct, the 
trial court must ensure that the "responsibility for the criminal conduct" is "firmly 
established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution. . . ." Mast, 
2001 UT App 402, \ 13 (citing Watson, 1999 UT App 273, | 5); see also Bickley, 2002 
UT App 342,112 (recognizing restitution may not be ordered where defendant's 
responsibility was not "firmly established"). In connection with the guilty pleas here, 
Brown admitted responsibility for conduct as follows. On January 23, 2007, he entered 
or remained unlawfully in Cheree's residence without permission and with intent to 
commit assault, he argued with Cheree and yelled, he hit Cheree, he fought with Spring 
and pushed her causing her to slip and injure herself, and he broke a door. (See R. 27; see 
also R. 126:4; 35, Presentence Report: 3; 49, Psychological Evaluation: 4-5). Based on 
those admissions, the trial court could order restitution for costs incurred as a result of 
16 
entering Cheree's residence without permission and with intent to coniniit assault, 
arguing with Cheree and hitting her, fighting with Spring and c a s i n g injury, anc 
:*;j:n,ijc i:iv . s_ ' uih ( -\\ - *: " -^  • "^«"*,-i|. :•*: .!*; court shall consider 
costs for damaged or destroyed property, costs for medical and professional services and 
care, costs for therapy and rehabilitation, and lost income and wages). 
::;'•/. c\c:\ , " ; * ' -'•'»" ' * '• - >: •• !-!^^ •:-• The rental 
expenses purportedly arose on August 1 and September 1, several months after the con • 
duct in this case. (See R. 65-66). They are not related to conduct ior \\ in/ii lirown ad-
mitted reSpOHMui: .; , -IH-.C "U -i ! ,rv-i... 11 ; |\ -fllll' 
'•••'• not admit to future conduct against Cheree and Spring. (See R. 26-33; 126; see afeo 
R. 35, Presentence Report: 3; 49, Psychological Evaluation: 4 -5 \ In auction, according 
to the prosecutor, Cheree s a i . ; - • ^ ^ ^ K " i hi 11 
i i ! :h-v ; - : a :i< for claiming that rental costs for August and September 2007 
arose "out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities." Utah 
Code Ann. Q ./-. u-; - :^ f;., inbson, ~M!i i .\;-L: - • N- sici-anu d^m^Lx- n-.. A -w'y e 
•• "•* : <v ov. -IK r;>r-,f'th ;-i • Mie criminal activities*'); ROJJWSOP, 860 P.2d at 983 
(stating liability for restitution must be "clear as a matter of law"). 
To the extent the trial court; made inference:.- JA .-. -v • . .:.{.»• •-.;*- --s 
iroiulnn in snppoit ,m fh\,ih( lor iclociitioii I'osts, die inferences were improper. See 
Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, \ 12 (recognizing trial court may not infer that defendant 
admitted responsibility for conduct outside the charged period) (citation onimc;;, wiasU 
\ov - ^ i t u - • _ L J t i * >!:,.< ' • • • » . • : •• -. • •• -*\ •
 t j ' ;• m a k e 
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defendant responsible for all damages resulting from burglary, since the trial court could 
not infer defendant's participation in burglary) (citation omitted); Watson, 1999 UT App 
273, f 5 (stating trial court may not infer defendant's involvement in murder where she 
entered a guilty plea for obstruction of justice); (see also infra, Argument II.B., herein). 
Thus, Brown camnot be required to pay restitution for relocation costs on that basis. 
Third, Brown was not convicted of offenses that "clearly resulted]" in expenses 
for rent deposit and two months' rent. See Eight, 2008 UT App 118, f^ 5 (stating when a 
defendant pleads guilty, the court has discretion to order restitution for "pecuniary 
damages clearly resulting from" the offense). He was convicted of committing a burglary 
and aggravated assault in January 2007. (R. 26-33). Thus, he could be ordered to pay for 
property damaged or destroyed, medical or professional services or care, therapy and 
rehabilitation, and lost income or wages "clearly resulting" from those crimes. See Eight, 
2008 UT App 118, U 5; Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b). 
However, he could not be ordered to pay relocation costs incurred approximately 
seven months later. Brown did not plead guilty to crimes involving future acts or conduct 
for August and September 2007. (See R. 26-33; 126). Moreover, the record fails to 
support that the relocation costs are related to the January crimes. (See record in general; 
see also infra, Argument II.B., herein). Thus, the trial court's restitution order for rent 
deposit and two months' rent was in error. See_ Eight, 2008 UT App 118,^5 (stating 
restitution may be ordered if damages "clearly resulted]" from the offense); Robinson, 
860 P.2d at 983 (stating restitution may be ordered where "commission of the crime 
clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages"); see also Glaubius v. State, 688 
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1
 . \ i () )-\ • • » • - ,
 r i c h 1997) (stating for restitution, the damage must be causally 
connected to the offense and it must bear a significant relationship to it); State v. 
Portentoso, S.>- \ o JC <• • • .\ •• .,-.• .> ' " • ; ' " h d 
»ll^ivHi -?i in ordering defendant to pay restitution in the amount oi $ 10,447.iU lu the 
victim following his guilty pleas to attempted aggravated assault and menacing by 
stalking; victim's moving expenses to: . . -;a^;, ,';w .;•: : . 7 • * •• -
• : : : •' \r^: suffered); State v Foram. 719 A.2d 399, 4lu (\ t. 199S; (stating the 
government must demonstrate "causation between the defendant's criminal act and the 
\ ivjtim'o loss ; "|_ajn urae;* ui IL^L:U.IK-.. J I J I I ' I ; . . I.II'K.LIC ^OK*L : •• 
<i.^pd:nf- "n:ni'*''! ;..•? f. v
 v, 7o— ho was convicted. If there is no direct link between the 
crime and the restitution, the claimed damage may not be awarded"); State v. Blanchfield, 
108 P.3d 173. 1^6 (Vv'a^li. I r. App. JUUM plating domestic \ iolen.ee vicing *, no ... .. 
- \ :ng expense^ i: 7 v; : • •:'•*..-" i:ir:::;irni\! :v-longings -- .TC not causally 
connected to the assault for which defendant was convicted, and therefore, should not 
have been part of trial court's restitution order). '1 hi.-. -* uiirt may reduce the restitution 
B. NEXT. THE RECORD FAILS TO SUPPORT THE RELOCATION COSTS. 
The trial court justified restitution for relocation costs on the grounds that the 
vicoii pioou'^o • » • ., oep' o:"" " • ;!:,i .'-' L^ ^ ..••:»:. . • i - ^ -.• i - : 
i - v . K. iu7: Iu). It stated, "that's what those things [deposits] are supposed to cover. 
Fm going to order the full amount of restitution." (R. 1 nr7:16). The record fails to 
support the trial ^uiirt ^ i uiiiig as a matter o! *u >v. 
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Specifically, in connection with the request for restitution, the State presented 
documents prepared by CVR for purposes of a reparations award. (R. 65-69). That was 
insufficient. Under Utah law, a court "shall not consider a reparations award when 
determining the order of restitution." Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-403(2); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b) (identifying criteria to consider in ordering restitution). 
In addition, the trial court based its ruling on assumptions and speculation. (R. 
107:16 (stating Cheree "probably" incurred costs)). That was improper. See Bickley, 
2002 UT App 342, f 12 (recognizing trial court may not make inferences); Mast, 2001 
UT App 402, Tf 18 (stating the restitution standards do not allow the trial court to make 
inferences to support an order for restitution); Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ^  5 (recog-
nizing trial court may not make inferences); State v. Wessendorf, 2006 UT App 197, No. 
20050771-CA, 2006 WL 1285028 (attached as Addendum C) (stating restitution for 
estimated cost of repair was improper where victim did not repair car but sold it for the 
same amount for which she bought it); (see also supra, pp. 11-12, 16-18). "There was no 
testimony about any out-of-pocket expense that the victim incurred due to [defendant's] 
conduct," Wessendorf, 2006 UT App 197, and no information connecting the crimes in 
January to rent deposit and rent for August and September 2007. (See record). 
Assuming arguendo Cheree lost a deposit on her former residence because Brown 
damaged the door, the cost for repairs and/or the amount in lost deposit may have been 
relevant to the assessment here. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (defining 
pecuniary damages as amounts "arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities" and including "the fair market value" of destroyed, 
20 
broken, or harmed property); see also People v. Hamilton, 555 N.E,2d 785, 789 (111. App. 
Ct. 1990) (ruling that victim's statement concerning replacement cost for damaged doors 
was suiiicicru;, ic\ a in pa* t o/.- ulli^r graarhij. !•••'*' 1- '" ' , : •  - • , : * t 
has stated, "[t]he appropriate measure of the loss or damage to a victim is fact-sensitive." 
CorbitU 2003 UT App 417, % 15. 
!i jails m >unport that Cheree incurred repair costs for the door, that she moved in Aui^, • : 
because of Brown or damage to She door, that she paid a refundable deposn on her lormer 
residence, or ma: :v ic-: .*.. »cpi»*>ii , *_••«;...• v • i- n-, . , \ : .,,.-. ^ ^ 
"• '"
ir:h: scejds^i Wessendorf, 2006 UT App 197 (reversing restitution where record failed 
lo support that victim made repairs); Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983 (allowing restitution only 
where "commission <»; u\c cnnw cica;:\ establishes causality of the injui y or damages" ) . 
•' -*v "r 'l»c*v !n - u : - ; i - 0 * ; -vn Brown responsible for rent in August and 
September. The award for two months' rent - as opposed to one month's rent or six 
months' rent - is arbitrary and has no connection to ;:.*. .M-mar- oi icii.v^.. IO^C \ c-. •• 
Based uii (he rcvnid h.iiv, "[i |t \; important lo note that [the victim] would have been pay-
ing housing expenses, regardless of the location" and regardless of this case. Portentoso, 
878 N.E.2d at 79, Indeed, the record fails to support ma: ^ heree won a /.\ •: n.i* , .*; 
; .-. ;:
 IK:,U.M a!\: Sept'MT'M' •••• '"••- l • • « - V • • --• • -* F ,•*• - Sec Robinson. 860 
P.2d at 983 (allowing restitution only where liability is clear and the crime caused 
damages). Since the record fails to support any connection between Brown and the 
relocation costs, thus ("oml nuy oidui thai restitutfoii IK* ivdikvd h\ thoM,: ammmls. 
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C. FINALLY, THE PROSECUTOR CLAIMED RESTITUTION WOULD 
COMPENSATE THE VICTIM FOR HER FEAR AND LOSS OF SAFETY. YET 
RESTITUTION IS NOT RECOVERABLE FOR THOSE PURPOSES. 
The prosecutor claimed that restitution for relocation costs would compensate the 
victim for fear and loss of safety. (R. 107:12, 13 (also stating that relocation was a 
"choice" that Cheree made, and she relocated seven months after the offenses in this 
case)). Damages for those purposes may be more properly classified as emotional harm 
or damages for pain and suffering. See, e.g., Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Health Care, 
1999 UT 102, ffif 7-15, 990 P.2d 384 (recognizing the civil claim of infliction of 
emotional distress); see also Forant, 719 A.2d at 403 (recognizing that even though the 
victim could identify an ascertainable amount for expenses incurred out of fear for her 
safety, those amounts would be classified as "essentially emotional distress damages'5). 
Such damages are not recoverable in restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-302(1) 
(limiting restitution to pecuniary damages); 77-38a-102(6) (defining pecuniary damages 
as economic injury "a person could recover in a civil action"; and specifically prohibiting 
restitution for pain and suffering); see also Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ^j 27-28 (Orme, 
J., concurring) (specifying that Utah courts do not permit restitution for "dignitary •' •'. 
invasions," including emotional harm) (citation omitted); ForanU 719 A.2d at 403 
(stating while staLtutes permit compensation for "[pecuniary loss" - which is defined as 
"medical or medically related expenses, lost wages" and other economic losses - victim 
may not recover "indirect costs" to compensate for her fear that defendant may access the 
house in the future and "harass her"). 
In addition, based on the limited information contained in the record in this case, 
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such damages may not be recoverable in a civil action. Mere unsubstantiated opinions 
that a person has suffered distress and fear are insufficient. See Harnicher v. University 
of Utah Medical Center, 962 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998) (recognizing that in a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, "[pjlaintiffs' mere unsubstantiated opinions that 
they have suffered severe anxiety as a result of their exposure" will not create an issue of 
fact that will withstand summary judgment); Walker v. RocJcy Mountain Recreation 
Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973) (ruling that "[statements made merely on 
information and belief will be disregarded"); see also Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonouzK 2003 UT 9, | 64, 70 P.3d 17 (stating a civil claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress "does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities"; a claim will not be supported merely 
because defendant engaged in conduct that is "tortious, injurious, or malicious, or 
because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal"). 
In this case, the prosecutor made an unsubstantiated and unsupported claim that 
Cheree should be entitled to recover relocation costs incurred seven months after the 
offenses as compensation for fear and loss of safety. (R. 107:12-13). Those statements 
constitute an insufficient claim for emotional distress. See^ Harnicher, 962 P.2d at 70 
(recognizing that "[pjlaintiffs' mere unsubstantiated opinions that they have suffered 
severe anxiety as a result of their exposure" are insufficient). Since such damages are not 
recoverable in restitution, the award is improper. See_ Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-3 02(1) 
(limiting restitution to pecuniary damages); id, at § 77-38a-102(6) (defining pecuniary 
damages as economic injury "a person could recover in a civil action"; and prohibiting 
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restitution for pain and suffering); State v. Miller. 2007 UT App 332, ffif 12-13, 170 P.3d 
1141 (recognizing that amounts not recoverable in a civil action may not be a basis for 
restitution); (see also R. 107:13 (prosecutor acknowledged that Cheree's relocation was a 
matter of "choice")). The trial court erred in ordering restitution for relocation costs. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Brown respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the judgment for aggravated burglary and remand the case for entry of a corrected 
judgment and sentence. Also, Brown respectfully requests that this Court vacate the trial 
court's restitution order as it relates to relocation costs. 
SUBMITTED this "~b day of \Q c>i; < ^ S ^ <_/• ,2008. 
\ / 
Linda M. Jones !J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ARMAND KWANZA BROWN, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Prison 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: HILLS, BLAKE R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 1, 1981 
Audio 
Tape Number: 76 Tape Count: 113418 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/12/2007 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/12/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071900771 FS 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: Aucrust 24. 2007 
Page 1 
Case No: 071900771 
Date: Aug 24, 2007 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Court ordered no contact with victim. 
The defendant is to complete an Anger Management Program until 
successful; 
The defendant is to pay full restitution and the State has 180 days 
to submit an Order; 
The defendant is to have evaluations on anger management, substance 
abuse and domestic violence and complete any treatment recommended; 
The defendant is to maintain full time verifiable employment 
approved by AP&P or combination of employment and school/training; 
The defendant has a curfew set by AP&P and ankle monitor if AP&P 
deems appropriate; 
The defendant is to obtain his high school diploma or GED; 
Page 2 
Case No: 071900771 
Date: Aug 24, 2007 
The defendant is to be released on this case, 
Dated this Vlf day of /V^/UJI 20^*7'!.\ "N h yuji 
ST^HEN JL HENR j^DD 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t , / j u d g e 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ARMAND KWANZA BROWN, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Own Recognizance 
MINUTES 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071900771 FS 
Judge: STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
Date: April 18, 2008 
Clerk: mckaem 
Prosecutor: MICKLOS, ANGELA F 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARDNER, BRIAN J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 1, 1981 
Audio 
Tape Number: 9-08 W4 7 Tape Count: 10:22 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/12/2007 Guilty 
2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/12/2007 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 9-08 W4 7 COUNT: 10:22 
This case is before the Court for a restitution hearing, 
orders full restitution to be paid. 
Restitution Amount: $2970.72 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SPRING WEATHERSPOON 
Court 
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Case No: 071900771 
Date: Apr 18, 2008 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
Defendant to pay $50.00 per month with payments to be made to AP&P 
with first payment due end of May 2008 
Dated t h i s %f day of /j%^Jf 2§Ct> 
^HEN L. HENRIOD 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
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TabB 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-403 (2004) 
§ 63-25a-403. Restitution—Reparations not to supplant restitution— Assignment of claim for 
restitution judgment to Reparations Office 
(1) A reparations award shall not supplant restitution as established under Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act, or as established by any other provisions. 
(2) The court shall not consider a reparations award when determining the order of restitution 
nor when enforcing restitution. 
(3) If, due to reparation payments to a victim, the Reparations Office is assigned under Section 
63-25a-419 a claim for the victim's judgment for restitution or a portion of the restitution, the 
Reparations Office may file with the sentencing court a notice of the assignment. The notice of 
assignment shall be signed by the victim and a Reparations Officer and shall state the amount of 
the claim assigned. 
(4) Upon conviction and sentencing of the defendant, the court shall enter a civil judgment for 
complete restitution as provided in Section 77-38a-401 and identify the Reparations Office as 
the assignee of the assigned portion of the judgment. 
(5) If the notice of assignment is filed after sentencing, the court shall modify the civil judgment 
for restitution to identify the Reparations Office as the assignee of the assigned portion of the 
judgment. 
Laws 1986, c. 150, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 46, § 3; Laws 1993. c. 72.$ 2; Laws 1996. c. 242,$ 
34. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws 2000, c. 235. $ 2. eff. May L 2000; Laws 2002. c. 35. § 2, eff 
May 6. 2002. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-25a-419 (2004) 
§ 63-25a-419. Assignment of recovery—Reimbursement 
(1) By accepting an award of reparations, the victim automatically assigns to the state, 
subject to the provisions of Subsection (2), all claims against any third party to the lesser 
of:' 
(a) the amount paid by the state; or 
(b) the amount recovered from the third party. 
(2) The board, with the concurrence of the director, may reduce the state's right of 
reimbursement if it is determined that the reduction will benefit the fund. 
(3) The state reserves the right to make a claim for reimbursement on behalf of the victim 
and the victim shall not impair the state's claim or the state's right of reimbursement. 
Laws 1993. c. 72. § 16; Laws 1996, c. 242, § 50., eff. April 29. 1996; Laws 2000. c. 
235. $ 10, eff. May 1,2000; Laws 2002. c. 256, § 53, eff. July L 2002. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2007) 
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed— Civil 
penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted 
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
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(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(0 to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter docs not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant 
was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
2 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a 
warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) 
shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single 
trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in 
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by 
any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise 
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to 
the county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after 
sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the 
county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility 
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under 
Section 64-Be-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in 
Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102. 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the daily inmate 
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incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional 
facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses 
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation 
for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by 
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, 
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection 
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall 
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter 
the reason for its order on the record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county 
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of 
incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59. § 1; Laws 
1983, c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; 
Laws 1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 81, 3 1; Laws 1992, c. 142. § 1: Laws 1993. c. 
17. § 1: Laws 1994. c. 13.3 19: Laws 1995, c. 111,3 L eff. May L 1995: Laws 1995, c. 
117. 3 L eff. May L 1995: Laws 1995. c. 301, 3 L eff Ma\ L 1995; Laws 1995. c. 337. 
3 1. eff May L 1995; Laws 1995. 1st Sp.Scss.. c. 10. 3 L eff April 29. 1996; Laws 
1996. c 40. 3 L ctT. April 29. 1996; Laws 1996. c. 79. 3 98. eff April 29, 1996; Laws 
1996. c. 241. 33 2. 3, eff. April 29. 1996: Laws 1998, c. 149. 3 L eff. Ma\ 4. 1998; 
Laws 1999. c. 270, 3 15. off. May 3. 1999; Laws 2001, c. 209. 3 L eff. April 30. 2001; 
Laws 2002. c. 35. 3 4, eff. May 6. 2002; Laws 2003. c. 280. 3 1. eff. May 5. 2003; Laws 
2006. c. 208. 3 L eff. May 1. 2006; Laws 2007. c. 154, 3 L eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 
2007, c. 339, 3 3. eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007. c. 353. 3 9, eff April 30, 2007. 
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Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-101 (2003) 
§77-38a-101. Title 
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act." 
Laws 2001. c. 137, § 2. eff. April 30. 2001. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 (Supp. 2008) 
§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the 
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make 
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost 
earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain 
and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant 
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the 
defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that 
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on 
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
l 
(9) "Pic: in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, 
following acceptance of the agreement b\ the court, a pica max he held in ahcxance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any 
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where 
charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal pa\mont ror pecuniar) damages to a 
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the lime of 
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and paym*.-.u .o. 
expenses to a governmental en1'"- ;^ r evfradu'o^ or n- >-^y>rt:,iif^ :«nd :K - m V '••-• •• • 
defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for inl ormatioi i leading to the arrest and conviction oi an 
offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide tl lis tni ormalion, except that 
the person receiving the payment may noi be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a 
bounty hunter, • • 
(13) "Screening" means the process u^ed In a prosecuting altorrie) to terminate 
investigate e actio!:, proceed with prosecution. mo\e to dismiss a prosecuiion lha: has 
been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be dh cried 
(14)(a) "Victii n" i i leans any pcrsoi I whom the court dctcrn hi i<; : s 1 las si il ft n. cd p ::ei u nary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" ma\ noi include ;; codefendant or accomplice. . . 
Laws 2001, c. 13 /, c? j , en. April ML 2001; Laws 2003. c. 278. S 2. eft May 5. 2003: 
Laws 2005, c. 96, § 3, eff. May 2. 2005. 
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Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-201 (2003) 
§ 77-38a-201. Restitution determination-Law enforcement duties and responsibilities 
Any law enforcement agency conducting an investigation for criminal conduct which 
would constitute a felony or class A misdemeanor shall provide in the investigative 
reports whether a claim for restitution exists, the basis for the claim, and the estimated or 
actual amount of the claim. 
LEWS 200L c. 137. § 4. eff. April 30. 2001. 
Utah ( ;uh: Ann. $ ~"7~38a~202 ('2003) 
§ .--.nSii-^uj. i<esi.;u:iv/ii aeici.nmaiii:;.- :\\^CCL:1;O:; oa;;. a;..: responsibilities 
(I ; ^ v;i ^.,.. ..•: .: -{•'.A .cl-oii o: J.: .:\ Oiii:^ pk\, J i>po^ il IOI : o; .: lciom or 
class \ misdemeanor, the atiomc\ general, count} attornc). munieipal attorne\. or 
district aUorue\ shah nr:'\ ide lo the district court: 
(a) the names of .. -, ;ci:m>. ino:uiiiiL ;i-i;\: parlies., asserting claims for restitution; 
(b) 1 1 ic actual or esl ii i ia 1 cd ai I ic i u it :: f rcsl iti il ioi i del iin i lii I :x:l al Li lal 1 h i ic; < u: id 
icj whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part of the 
plea disposition, 
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution... the atl orncy general, coi inty al ton i.ey., 
municipal attorney, or district attorney shall; 
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 lor establishing restitution amounts; 
and 
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea 
disposition all claims for restitiition arising out of the investigation for which the 
defendant >•* <h:^ •* ? 
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution claims 
from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court. 
Laws 2uui. c. i J /. ^ ?. en. /\pru MI. ~UUI . 
Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-203(Supp. 2008) 
§ 77-38a-203. Restitution determination—Department of Corrections— Presentence 
investigation 
(l)(a) The department shall prepare a presentence investigation report in accordance with 
Subsection 77-18-1 (5). The prosecutor and law enforcement agency involved shall 
provide all available victim information to the department upon request. The victim 
impact statement shall: 
(i) identify all victims of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; 
(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the recommended 
amount of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302, accompanied by a 
recommendation from the department regarding the payment by the defendant of 
court-ordered restitution with interest as defined in Section 77-38a-302; 
(iv) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the victim as a 
result of the offense, and the seriousness and permanence; 
(v) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a 
result of the offense; 
(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim or the 
victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vii) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim 
or the victim's family that the court requires. 
(b) The crime victim shall be responsible to provide to the department upon request all 
invoices, bills, receipts, and other evidence of injury, loss of earnings, and out-of-
pocket loss. The crime victim shall also provide upon request: 
(i) all documentation and evidence of compensation or reimbursement from insurance 
companies or agencies of the state of Utah, any other state, or federal government 
received as a direct result of the crime for injury, loss, earnings, or out-of-pocket loss; 
and 
(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security number, drivers 
license number, next of kin, and home and work address and telephone numbers. 
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(c) The inability . 'aiiure. ur refusal of the ^rmie \ ielim to pro\ ;de ail or pari oi :iu-
requested information shall resuli in die court determining restiluiion based on !i:e be<! 
informal ion available. 
(2)(a) The court si lall order the del endant as part of the presentence investigation ^ 
submit to the department any information determined necessary to be disclosed for ihe 
purpose of ascertaining the restitution. 
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide a!! or part -of-lie requisite 
information shall constitute a \\ai\ er of any grounds to appeal or seek future 
amendment or aher*!''''^ -T11 ;,,,.i,.,,:: —- order predicated on iU ; und!-o;!o>cd 
information, 
«'e) If i!ie defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the resliunioi 1 
recommended in :he presentence investigation, the court shall set a hearing dak- ; • 
resolve the matter. 
..w. ii
 ti:i> parly tails to challenge trie accuracy of the presei itence investigation poll al 
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
Laws 2001. c. 137. § 6, eff April 30. 2001; Laws 2005. c. 96. § 4. eff. May 2, 2005. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-301 (2003) 
§ 77-38a-301. Restitution—Convicted defendant may be required to pay 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution. 
Laws 2001. c. 137. § 1. eff. April 30, 2001. 
I I ' l l l i l 'I m i l ' U i l i ,
 ::j " • ^S>I- .MJJ , I M l [ l | ) , J I I K M 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity mai has resuked :;i pecuniar) 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it ma> impose, the court shall o:\lcr thai the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crinic as provided in this chapter, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) 
and in determining whether resiiuuion is appropriate, the eouri shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2i through (5). 
(2) In determining resiujimn. :,UL court slum Uciermnij complete restitiltioi i and court-
ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all 
losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of 
sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(> } i i ihe LUU; i ULVC, mines mat restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, 
tf" rt^-r Jviii ^<a, * :h^ reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) ii'iiic dclcnciaul objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, 
the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall inchidc 
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the 
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a 
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly 
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
\ "Hi uviL-i mining the monetary sum ana omer cmiomoi. - ior complete restitutioi L tl ie 
< ^--' si'.'.ll consider all relevant facts. :i1 -V'^'vy 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
l 
destruction of properly of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment 
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of 
treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in 
bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to 
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the 
victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, 
the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution 
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time 
of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
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(c) The Board of I'ardw:i>
 uu\. i ..M.ML mc.\. \MUUH UI.C year alter sentencing, refer an 
order ofjudgmenl and ciy.r-<^.'-—u-^\ h:\rl \r, ihe conn for determination ofrestitution. 
Laws 2001. c. 137. 3 8, eff. April 30, 2001: Laws 2002. c. 35. 3 13. eff. May 6. 2002: 
Laws 2002, c. 185, $51 , eff. May 6. 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285. $ I, eff. May 5. 2003; 
Laws 2005. c. 96. 3 5. eff. May 2. 2005. 
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State v. Wessendorf 
Utah App.,2006. 
IINPUHLISIII-D OPINION. CHECK 
C O l / R n i M L k S BKFORH CITING. 
. ..-u/i •*». A: peais ol l;Ut;;. 
S1 A i h o\ Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dan-ell Lawrence WESSENDORF, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
N- - ""-6. 
Eighth District, Duchesne Department, 
0 4 ! 8 0 0 r 0 : 1 he Honorable John R. 
Anderson. 
Cniu) ,•. s *r 
AppcllaiiL. 
Mark L. ShurtleiT and Matthew D. Bates, 
Salt Lake City; for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, BILLINGS, and 
TIIORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Darrell Lawrence Wessendorf appeals 
the trial court's order of restitution. Lie 
asserts (he amount of restitution was 
inlpropci'. ie'e ruined. Ailhough 
Wessendorf has hied bis opening brief, 
this is before the .our! on ihe State's 
motion for summary reversal because the 
State concedes there was error. 
A; ihe hearing to determine restitution, 
the \ letim lestillcd that she o:n no: ha\e 
the \ chicle repaired, but instead sold it 
for ahwiil me ^ame amount lor \\.*^\\ :>l~ie 
had bought it. Kven though she did not, 
and would not. iiiLiir economic damage 
based on inc repair estimate, Tc trial 
court awarded restitution based on the 
repair estimate. The State concedes that 
this was ;,M M' in n nT , , : ' ! ; ' : n"v --,r* <T 
restitution. 
Restitution is the payn lent of pecuniary 
damages resulting from a defendant's 
criminal conduct. ffeeUtah Code Ann. $ 
77-38a-102(in (Supp.2005). Pecuniary 
damage is demonstrable economic 
injury. See id § 77-38a-102(6VThe 
appropriate measure of the loss or 
damage to a victim is fact-sensitive and 
will vary based on the "iacls of a 
particular case.'^to/e v. Corhitt, 2003 
UTApp417,«,[ 15, 82 P.3d 211,A1 though 
the estimated cost of repair of the vehicle 
damage was about $1200. the vie-im did 
not suffer economic mm:*;. :hat 
amount hecause she dici not u v. J the 
repairs performed. There \ur> no 
testimony about an} out-of-pocket 
expense that the victim incurred due to 
Wessendorf s conduct, i low ever, there 
was :c>limon\ mat ihe -chic!'., market 
value ma; iv \c been reduced by 
Wessendorfs conduct, '.\hich \\t*udd he a 
more appropriate measure ol" economic 
loss if proven 
According U. we \acalc ':,; ir::. court's 
restitulion order and remand 0 ,- a new 
restitution hearing. We need not rea.;_ 
the other issues raised by Wessendorf 
because - * ——-m fhr -; • w hearing. 
Utah App.,2006. 
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